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I.

INTRODUCTION

Tribal court dockets across the country have been growing
steadily, and tribal courts are becoming an important part of the
1
judicial fabric of the United States. To acknowledge this reality,
state courts and legislatures across the United States have begun to
address the important issues of how and whether to recognize
2
tribal court judgments in state courts. The Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted a rule that took effect in January of 2004 that
1. Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts,
33 TULSA L.J. 1, 2 (1997).
2. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1E-1(a) (2003) (“The courts of this State shall
give full faith and credit to a judgment, decree, or order signed by a judicial
officer of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and filed in the Cherokee Tribal
Court to the same extent as is given a judgment, decree, or order of another state .
. . provided that the judgments, decrees, and orders of the courts of this State are
given full faith and credit by the Tribal Court of the Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-25 (Michie 2003) (stating “[n]o order or
judgment of a tribal court in the state of South Dakota may be recognized as a
matter of comity in the state courts of South Dakota, except under [certain] terms
and conditions” established by clear and convincing evidence); 17B ARIZ. REV.
STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1-7 (establishing full faith and credit for tribal courts,
unless objection filed); MICH. CT. R. 2.615 (establishing that judgments and orders
of tribal courts granting reciprocity to Michigan courts were presumed valid and
given full faith and credit unless objecting party proves one of enumerated
factors); OKLA. DIST. CT. R. 30(b) (adopted 1994) (granting full faith and credit
where tribal courts reciprocate); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 82.5(c) (granting full
faith and credit to tribal court orders, judgments, and decrees as long as there is
reciprocity, due process, and jurisdiction); WIS. STAT. § 806.245 (2003)
(proclaiming full faith and credit for tribal courts, but setting forth a list of
requirements that look more like comity); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-111 (Michie
2002) (granting full faith and credit to the judicial records, orders, and judgments
of the courts of the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes of the Wind
River Reservation, unless one of the four enumerated requirements is not met);
John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 763 (Alaska 1999) (holding that Alaska courts should,
as a general rule, “respect tribal court decisions under the comity doctrine”);
Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 859 P.2d 420, 429
(Mont. 1993) (upholding comity for tribal court judgments).
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provides guidelines for the recognition and enforcement of tribal
3
court orders and judgments. The Minnesota Supreme Court Rule
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Tribal Court Orders and
Judgments (“Minnesota Rule”) followed closely on the heels of a
4
similar rule by the Arizona Supreme Court.
Though the
Minnesota and Arizona rules are close in time, they staked out
5
quite different approaches. The Arizona Supreme Court Rules of
Procedure for the Recognition of Tribal Court Civil Judgments
(“Arizona Rules”) reflect tremendous respect for tribal courts and
provide clear guidance to lower state court judges as to how to
6
handle tribal court judgments. The Minnesota Rule, in contrast,
adopts a much more tentative stance toward tribal court orders and
judgments and provides little or no guidance to state court judges
7
as to whether to recognize a tribal judgment.
All of the recent activity in state courts and legislatures,
together with the important policy issues underlying these
8
questions, has fueled voluminous academic commentary. The
3. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.
4. See 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1-7.
5. Compare 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1-7 with MINN. R. GEN.
PRACT. 10.
6. See 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1-7.
7. See MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.
8. Robert N. Clinton et al., Dispute Resolution in Indian Country: Does
Abstention Make the Heart Grow Fonder?, 71 N.D. L. REV. 541, 554-55 (1995); Robert
N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal
Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77 (1993); Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the
Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 841 (1990); P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence,
Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreements: The Topology of the Negotiation
and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365 (1994); Karla Engle, Red Fox v.
Hettich: Does South Dakota’s Comity Statute Foster Unwarranted State Court Intrusion into
Tribal Jurisdictional Authority Over Civil Disputes?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 706 (1993); Daina
B. Garonzik, Full Reciprocity for Tribal Courts from a Federal Courts Perspective: A
Proposed Amendment to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 45 EMORY L.J. 723 (1996); Robert
Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federal Indian Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 861
(2000); Richard E. Ransom et al., Recognizing and Enforcing State and Tribal
Judgments: A Roundtable Discussion of Law, Policy, and Practice, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
239 (1993); see Robert Laurence, The Role, if Any, for the Federal Courts in the CrossBoundary Enforcement of Federal, State and Tribal Money Judgments, 35 TULSA L.J. 1
(1999); Robert Laurence, The Off-Reservation Garnishment of an On-Reservation Debt
and Related Issues in the Cross-Boundary Enforcement of Money Judgments, 22 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 355 (1998); Robert Laurence, The Convergence of Cross-Boundary Enforcement
Theories in American Indian Law: An Attempt to Reconcile Full Faith and Credit, Comity
and Asymmetry, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 115 (1998); Robert Laurence, The Bothersome
Need for Asymmetry in Any Federally Dictated Rule of Recognition for the Enforcement of
Money Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries, 27 CONN. L. REV. 979 (1995);
Robert Laurence, Dominant-Society Law and Tribal Court Adjudication, 25 N.M. L.
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academic literature includes several articles that fill a useful niche
in describing the development of the law in the specific context of
9
rules for the recognition of tribal court judgments. This article
seeks to add to the existing scholarship within that niche by
describing the development of the Arizona and Minnesota rules.
In addition, it seeks to offer a substantive critique of the Minnesota
Rule and some suggestions as to the broader lessons that can be
learned from the process.
This article will critically evaluate the Minnesota Rule by
comparing and contrasting its development, as well as its
substantive content, with the new Arizona Rules. Part II of this
article will describe the Minnesota Rule and compare it to the
10
Arizona Rules that shortly preceded it. Part III will describe the
rulemaking processes that produced the Minnesota and Arizona
Rules and seek to provide insight into how Minnesota reached such
11
a markedly different result than Arizona. Part III will also mine
the insights from these processes and from other sources to offer
some explanation as to why the Arizona Supreme Court embraced
tribal courts respectfully while the Minnesota Supreme Court
12
addressed tribal courts cautiously.
Part IV will conclude by
encouraging the Minnesota Supreme Court to view its new rule as a
cautious first step and urging the court to consider a reREV. 1 (1995); Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian
Reservation Boundaries: Full Faith and Credit, Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69
OR. L. REV. 589 (1990); Stacy L. Leeds, Cross Jurisdictional Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments: A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311 (2000); Fred
L. Ragsdale, Jr., Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7
N.M. L. REV. 133 (1977); Melissa L. Tatum, A Jurisdictional Quandary: Challenges
Facing Tribal Governments in Implementing the Full Faith and Credit Provisions of the
Violence Against Women Acts, 90 KY. L.J. 123, 138-39, 183-84 (2002); William V.
Vetter, Of Tribal Courts and “Territories”: Is Full Faith and Credit Required?, 23 CAL. W.
L. REV. 219 (1987).
9. See Michael F. Cavanaugh, Michigan’s Story: State and Tribal Court Try to Do
the Right Thing, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 709 (1999) (discussing Michigan’s
adoption of rule for the recognition of tribal court judgments); Ralph J. Erickstad
& James Ganje, Tribal and State Courts – A New Beginning, 71 N.D. L. REV. 569, 57980 (1995) (describing adoption of North Dakota rule for recognition of tribal
judgments); Darby L. Hoggatt, Comment, The Wyoming Tribal Full Faith and Credit
Act: Enforcing Tribal Judgments and Protecting Tribal Sovereignty, 30 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 531 (1995); see also James A. Bransky & Hon. Garfield W. Hood, The
State/Tribal Court Forum: Moving Tribal and State Courts from Conflict to Cooperation, 72
MICH. B.J. 420, 420 (1993).
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part III.
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examination of the question after appropriate experience has
13
developed from which to evaluate the current rule.

II. THE NEW RULES FOR RECOGNITION OF TRIBAL COURT
JUDGMENTS
The differing approaches to the question of the recognition of
14
tribal court judgments reflect a wide spectrum. On one end of
the spectrum are those states that are highly respectful of tribal
15
court civil judgments. Courts in Idaho and New Mexico, for
example, accord tribal courts “full faith and credit” under federal
law, the same level of respect that they accord to other state
16
17
courts. Courts in several other states, such as Oklahoma, assert
“full faith and credit” for tribal courts, but go on to define that
phrase in a particular manner that affords slightly less respect to
18
judgments of tribal courts than judgments of state courts. Some
states eschew the “full faith and credit” language, but direct lower
courts to exercise “comity” in determining whether to recognize
19
tribal court judgments.
Most states fall within one of these three bands along the
13. See infra Part III.
14. See Leeds, supra note 8, at 331-46 (outlining a thorough survey of how
state courts have addressed these questions).
15. See id. at 332 (stating that Idaho and New Mexico are the only states to
include tribes in the federal Full Faith and Credit Act’s definition of “territory,”
thus giving full faith and credit recognition to tribal courts, just as they would to
other states’ courts); see also Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902 (Idaho
1982); Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 527 P.2d 1222, 1228 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).
16. The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected such an approach, at least as an
interpretation of the federal Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit clause. See
Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
17. Oklahoma accorded full faith and credit through legislative authorization
and judicial rule. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 728 (2000); OKLA DIST. CT. R. 30(b); see
also Dennis W. Arrow, Oklahoma’s Tribal Courts: A Prologue, the First Fifteen Years of the
Modern Era, and a Glimpse at the Road Ahead, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 5, 63-70
(1994) (describing the process through which Oklahoma’s tribal recognition rule
developed); Shelly Grunsted, Full Faith and Credit: Are Oklahoma’s Tribal Courts
Finally Getting the Respect They Deserve?, 36 TULSA L.J. 381 (2000) (addressing the
effect the Full Faith and Credit clause has on Indian Nations).
18. For example, Michigan extends full faith and credit only to those tribal
courts that offer reciprocity to judgments from Michigan courts. MICH. CT. R.
2.615.
19. See, e.g., John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 763 (Alaska 1999) (holding that
Alaska courts should, as a general rule, “respect tribal court decisions under the
comity doctrine”).
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spectrum: actual full faith and credit, purported full faith and
credit, and comity. Each of these positions is somewhat respectful
toward tribal courts because in most run-of-the-mill cases, tribal
court judgments will be recognized and enforced. However, one
other approach is worth mentioning. The South Dakota statute on
recognition of tribal court judgments creates a presumption against
20
recognition and requires a party seeking recognition of a tribal
judgment to prove numerous facts related to the validity of the
21
tribal judgment by clear and convincing evidence. If these facts are
proven, then a state court judge may recognize the tribal judgment,
22
but even so, only in a narrow range of circumstances. To be sure,
South Dakota occupies a lonely and extreme point at the end of
the spectrum. The majority of states have adopted the notion of
full faith and credit for tribal court rulings or a very respectful
expression of comity. Many states, however, have not yet addressed
the question. Because Minnesota and Arizona have recently
adopted rules for the recognition of tribal court judgments and
orders, they may be guides for other states.
A. The Minnesota Rule
After nearly a decade of discussion by several tribal and state
court judges as well as other interested individuals and
organizations, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in an order dated
December 11, 2003, adopted a rule for the recognition of tribal
23
court orders and judgments. The rule is primarily hortatory in
24
nature and is agnostic as to whether to respect tribal court
judgments. As such, it is a disappointment to many of its original
25
proponents. The Minnesota Rule requires recognition of tribal
court orders and judgments only where already mandated by state

20. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-25 (Michie 2003); see also Red Fox v. Hettich,
494 N.W.2d 638, 647 (S.D. 1993) (holding that tribal member did not satisfy
burden of proof necessary to show that tribal court had jurisdiction so that its
judgment should be recognized under principle of comity).
21. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-25(1)(a)-(e) (emphasis added).
22. Id. § 1-1-25(2)(a)-(d).
23. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10 (effective Jan. 1, 2004).
24. MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENERAL RULES OF
PRACTICE, FINAL REPORT at 4 (2002).
25. Interview with Hon. Andrew M. Small, Associate Judge, Prairie Island
Mdewakanton Dakota & Lower Sioux Communities, Bloomington, Minnesota
(June 3, 2004) (on file with author).
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26

or federal statute.
Where not mandated by statute, the rule
merely provides a list of discretionary factors for a court to consider
in determining whether to recognize and enforce a tribal court
27
order or judgment. The rule requires no hearing and establishes
28
It addresses two
no presumption for or against recognition.
general areas: recognition where mandated by other law (Rule
10.01) and discretionary recognition (Rule 10.02). A critical
description follows.
1.

Recognition Where Mandated by State or Federal Statute

The Minnesota Rule provides at the outset that the orders,
29
judgments, and other judicial acts of tribal courts shall be
recognized and enforced where mandated by state or federal
30
31
Currently, only three federal and four Minnesota
statute.
26. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.01(a).
27. Id. 10.02(a).
28. Id.
29. The Minnesota Rule includes the tribal courts of “any federally
recognized Indian tribe.” Id. 10.01(a). Some states limit recognition to the courts
of tribes within the state. See, e.g., N.Y. INDIAN LAW § 52 (McKinney 2003)
(providing since 1909 that decisions of the peacemaker courts of the Seneca
Nation are enforceable in state court); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1E-1(a) (2003) (stating
“[t]he courts of this State shall give full faith and credit to a judgment, decree, or
order signed by a judicial officer of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and
filed in the Cherokee Tribal Court to the same extent as is given a judgment,
decree, or order of another state . . . provided that the judgments, decrees, and
orders of the courts of this State are given full faith and credit by the Tribal Court
of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-09 (1991)
(stating “[t]he district courts shall recognize and cause to be enforced any
judgment, decree, or order of the tribal court of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the
Fort Berthold Reservation in any case” and subjecting the recognition to certain
requirements, including “[reciprocity] involving the dissolution of marriage, the
distribution of property upon divorce, child custody, adoption, an adult abuse
protection order, or an adjudication of the delinquency, dependency, or neglect
of Indian children if the tribal court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
judgment, decree, or order”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-111 (Michie 2002) (granting
full faith and credit to the judicial records, orders and judgments of the courts of
the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes of the Wind River
Reservation, unless one of enumerated requirements is not met).
30. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.01(a).
31. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act is arguably a fourth federal
statute that creates such a mandate, but it is omitted in the Advisory Committee’s
comments to the Minnesota Rule. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1738A (2000) (requiring states to enforce custody and visitation
determinations of other states). Although the definition of “State” provided in the
statute does not specifically include tribes, some courts have held that it requires
full faith and credit for tribal court orders. Leeds, supra note 8, at 333 (examining

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 5
5WASHBURN

486

3/29/2005 2:48:21 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

statutes address the recognition of tribal court orders and
judgments. The federal statutes consist of the Violence Against
32
33
Women Act (“VAWA”), the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”),
34
and the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act. The
Minnesota statutes consist of the Uniform Child Custody
35
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the Uniform Interstate Family
36
37
Support Act, the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act, and
38
the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act.
Given that these federal and state statutes already mandate the
recognition of tribal court orders, this portion of the new
Minnesota Rule adds little to the law and simply insures that the
rule is read in a manner consistent with existing law.

“political and legal relationships between tribal courts and their state and federal
counterparts”).
32. Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a)-(b) (2000) (providing
that a protection order issued by a tribal court “shall be accorded full faith and
credit” by state courts, “and enforced as if it were the order of the enforcing State,”
provided the tribal court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction, and the
person against whom the order is sought was given “reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard”). The statute does not require prior registration for the
order to be enforced. Id. § 2265(d)(2).
33. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (2000) (requiring states to
give “full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings”).
34. Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B
(a), (b) (2000) (including “Indian country” in the definition of “State” and
providing that states “shall enforce according to its terms a child support order
made . . . by a court of another state” as long as the issuing court had personal and
subject matter jurisdiction, and the contestants had reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard).
35. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, MINN. STAT. §
518D.104 (2002) (requiring state to treat a tribe “as if it were a state of the United
States” and to recognize and enforce child custody determinations made by
tribes).
36. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, MINN. STAT. § 518C.101(s)(1)
(2002) (including “Indian tribe” in the definition of “State”).
37. Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act, MINN. STAT. § 260.771, subd. 4
(2002) (providing that orders of a tribal court concerning placement of children
“shall have the same force and effect as orders of a court of this state”).
38. Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act, MINN.
STAT. § 548.35, subd. 3 (2002) (providing that a foreign money judgment is
“enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of another state which is
entitled to full faith and credit” unless the judgment is not conclusive because of a
list of comity-type factors). While this statute does not expressly mention tribes,
the Advisory Committee comment states that “[t]ribal court money judgments fall
within the literal scope of this statute and the statutory procedures therefore may
guide Minnesota courts considering money judgments.” MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10
advisory comm. cmt.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/5

8

Washburn and Thompson: A Legacy of Public Law 280: Comparing and Contrasting Minnesota’s
5WASHBURN

2004]

3/29/2005 2:48:21 PM

A LEGACY OF PUBLIC LAW 280

487

Rule 10.01 next purports to establish procedures for the
enforcement of tribal court orders and judgments where required
39
by federal or state statute.
Given the procedural ambiguity in
some of the statutes mandating enforcement and recognition, such
guidance would be helpful, particularly in light of the problems
40
that frequently arise when recognition is federally mandated.
However, Rule 10.01 does not live up to its billing. Rule 10.01
states that “[w]here an applicable state or federal statute establishes
a procedure for enforcement of any tribal court order or judgment,
41
that procedure must be followed.”
Unfortunately, only two of the state and two of the federal
statutes contemplated in the Advisory Committee comment to the
Minnesota Rule provide detailed procedures.
Minnesota’s
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act provides instructions as to
which court order should be controlling in the event that two or
more separate courts have entered orders regarding the same child
42
and obligor, and even provides some procedures for the
43
enforcement of tribal support orders.
Minnesota’s Uniform
Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act specifically
44
discusses the grounds for non-recognition of foreign judgments.
The federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act
provides that a child support order issued by a court of another
state (which includes tribes) shall be enforced if the other court
had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction and provided
39. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.01(b).
40. See generally Leeds, supra note 8, at 349 (noting a high instance of nonrecognition, “often in direct violation of state policy or federal law”). See also, e.g.,
PROCEDURES & FORMS COMM., PROCEDURES FOR REGISTRATION OF FOREIGN DOMESTIC
ABUSE ORDERS (2004) (on file with author) (stating that although VAWA mandates
full faith and credit, “in practical application, there are varying protocols
throughout the United States on how this law is enforced”); Letter from Heidi A.
Drobnick, Executive Director, Indian Child Welfare Law Center, to Frederick
Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Oct. 14, 2002) (Supreme Court
Administrative Files CD-ROM, Disk 3 and 4, General Rules of Practice, No. CX-891863, 02-08-28 Order Tribal Ct 10-29-02 Hearing & Responses, current through
January 1, 2004) [hereinafter CD-ROM] (on file with author) (noting that lack of
a procedural rule is a recurring problem in the enforcement of tribal court orders
involving Indian children and teenagers, and providing five examples recently
encountered by her agency in which non-recognition of tribal court orders placed
Indian children and teenagers in dangerous situations).
41. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.01(b)(1).
42. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, MINN. STAT. § 518C.207 (2002).
43. Id. §§ 518C.508, 518C.601-04.
44. Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act, MINN.
STAT. § 548.35, subd. 4 (2002).
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45

reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard to contestants.
VAWA arguably goes the furthest of the federal statutes in
providing a procedure for the recognition of tribal court orders.
Under VAWA, a tribal order shall be “enforced as if it were the
46
order of the enforcing State or tribe” if the tribal court had
personal and subject matter jurisdiction and provided reasonable
notice and opportunity to be heard to the person against whom the
47
order is sought. VAWA does not require registration or filing of
the order in the enforcing jurisdiction prior to enforcement. Nor
does it require that the party against whom the order was issued be
provided notice that the protection order has been registered or
48
filed in the enforcing jurisdiction.
The other state and federal statutes, even though their
wording is mandatory and unqualified, nevertheless provide little
guidance as to procedures for the recognition and enforcement of
49
tribal court orders and judgments.
The ICWA, for example,
mandates that states grant full faith and credit to Indian child
50
custody proceedings in tribal courts.
Though such clear and
unqualified language ought to cause the routine enforcement of
tribal court orders regarding Indian children, the result has been
more complicated. More than a quarter century after ICWA was
enacted, tribal court orders regarding Indian children are not
51
always enforced.
After mandating that specific procedures for enforcement
established by state or federal statute must be followed, Rule 10.01
52
provides more detailed guidelines only for VAWA. VAWA already
53
contains fairly detailed guidelines.
The lack of guidance in at
least some of the other statutes has demonstrably been a barrier to
the recognition and enforcement of tribal court orders and
54
judgments.
The Minnesota Tribal Court/State Court Forum
45. Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(c)
(2000).
46. Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2000).
47. Id. § 2265(b).
48. Id. § 2265(d).
49. See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (2000).
50. Id.
51. See sources cited supra note 40 (discussing problems with the enforcement
of tribal court orders regarding Indian children).
52. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.01(b)(2).
53. See sources cited supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing the
VAWA).
54. See sources cited supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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(“Minnesota Forum”) specifically requested the insertion of
additional language in Rule 10.01 regarding procedures for the
enforcement of tribal court orders and judgments under the Full
Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, the Indian Child
Welfare Act, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, and the
55
Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act.
Yet language that
might provide such guidance was not included. As a result, Rule
10.01, which had the potential to make a useful contribution in
clarifying these procedures for recognition of tribal court orders
and judgments already mandated by statute, actually accomplished
little in this regard and provides little specific guidance. While the
procedures for VAWA are helpful, similar guidance would have
been useful in insuring recognition of the orders contemplated in
these other important statutes.
Thus, Rule 10.01, which addresses statutes mandating
recognition, can be considered, at best, a modest first step. The
provisions related to VAWA may serve as a useful model for future
56
additions to the rule to address these other important statutes.
2.

Recognition Discretionary Where Not Mandated by Statute

Rule 10.02 addresses recognition of tribal court orders and
judgments where recognition is not mandated by statute. Given
the absence of statutory direction, numerous approaches were
available to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Of the numerous state
courts that have already addressed the issue, most have taken an
approach that would provide actual full faith and credit, purported
57
full faith and credit, or comity.
Each of these approaches is
respectful of tribal court judgments. The original proponents of
such a Minnesota rule advocated a model that took shape in several
other states: a rebuttable presumption in favor of recognition and a
list of factors to aid courts in determining whether the presumption
58
59
had been rebutted. Such an approach has been widely adopted
55. Letter from Minnesota Tribal Court/State Court Forum to Frederick
Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Nov. 3, 2003) (CD-ROM, supra note
40).
56. The Advisory Committee’s comments on the rule provide additional
sound guidance.
57. See sources cited supra note 2. South Dakota is a notable exception.
58. This was the approach suggested by the Minnesota Tribal Court/State
Court Forum. Petition for Adoption of a Rule of Procedure for the Recognition of Tribal
Court Orders and Judgments, Minnesota Supreme Court, No. CX-89-1863, at A-1
(filed Apr. 11, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40) (petitioning the Minnesota
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because it demonstrates respect for tribal courts while preserving
state court discretion to insure justice is done.
In Rule 10.02, the Minnesota Supreme Court took a different
approach that can best be characterized as agnostic. It provides no
presumption one way or the other with regard to the recognition
and enforcement of tribal court orders and judgments not
mandated by state or federal statute, stating simply that
“enforcement of a tribal court order or judgment is discretionary
with the court” and providing a list of factors that the court may
60
consider in the exercise of their discretion. The factors include:
(1) whether the party against whom the order or
judgment will be used has been given notice and an
opportunity to be heard or, in the case of matters
properly considered ex parte, whether the respondent will
be given notice and an opportunity to be heard within a
reasonable time;
(2) whether the order or judgment appears valid on its
Supreme Court for a rule stating that tribal court orders and judgments are
“presumed valid and enforceable and shall be given full faith and credit by the
courts of the State of Minnesota” unless the objecting party can demonstrate lack
of personal or subject matter jurisdiction; fraud, duress, or coercion; lack of fair
notice or fair hearing; or, in some cases, a non-final order). [hereinafter Minnesota
Petition]. While the Petition used the words “full faith and credit,” its approach
more nearly resembled comity. Full faith and credit is a non-discretionary
doctrine most often utilized on a state-to-state basis, whereas comity is a
discretionary doctrine which allows a court to consider various factors in
determining whether to recognize the judgment or order of a foreign court. See,
e.g., MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10 advisory comm. cmt.
59. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 806.245 (2003) (proclaiming full faith and credit for
tribal courts, but setting forth a list of requirements that look more like comity);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-111 (Michie 2002) (granting full faith and credit to the
judicial records, orders, and judgments of the courts of the Eastern Shoshone and
Northern Arapaho Tribes of the Wind River Reservation, unless one of
enumerated requirements is not met); 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1-7
(establishing full faith and credit for tribal courts unless an objection is filed);
MICH. CT. R. 2.615 (judgments and orders of tribal courts granting reciprocity to
Michigan courts presumed valid and given full faith and credit unless objecting
party proves one of enumerated factors); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 728 (2003); OKLA.
DIST. CT. R. 30(b); WA. SUPER. CT. CIV. C.R. 82.5(c) (full faith and credit to tribal
court orders, judgments, and decrees as long as there is reciprocity, due process,
and jurisdiction); Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997)
(concluding that “as a general principle, federal courts should recognize and
enforce tribal judgments”); John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 763 (Alaska 1999)
(holding that Alaska courts should, as a general rule, “respect tribal court
decisions under the comity doctrine”); Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 859 P.2d 420
(Mont. 1993) (upholding comity for tribal court judgments).
60. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.02(a).
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face and, if possible to determine, whether it remains in
effect;
(3) whether the tribal court possessed subject-matter
jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the person of the parties;
(4) whether the issuing tribal court was a court of record;
(5) whether the order or judgment was obtained by fraud,
duress, or coercion;
(6) whether the order or judgment was obtained through
a process that afforded fair notice, the right to appear and
compel attendance of witnesses, and a fair hearing before
an independent magistrate;
(7) whether the order or judgment contravenes the public
policy of this state;
(8) whether the order or judgment is final under the laws
and procedures of the rendering court, unless the order is
a non-criminal order for the protection or apprehension
of an adult, juvenile or child, or another type of
temporary, emergency order;
(9) whether the tribal court reciprocally provides for
recognition and implementation of orders, judgments
and decrees of the courts of this state; and
(10) any other factors the court deems appropriate in the
61
interests of justice.
While several of the factors listed in Rule 10.02 mirror the
62
factors considered under traditional principles of comity, both
61. Id.
62. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 158 (1895) (setting forth the following
considerations for comity:
opportunity for a full and fair trial . . . before a court of competent
jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due
citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice . . .
[with] nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of
laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or
any other special reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it
full effect);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 (1987) (stating
(1) A court in the United States may not recognize a judgment of the
court of a foreign state if:
(a) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of
law; or
(b) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction
over the defendant in accordance with the law of the rendering state[.]
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63

factor 9 (reciprocity) and factor 10 (any other factor deemed
appropriate) introduce considerations that lie outside traditional
comity analysis. By recognizing discretion to consider any other
“appropriate factor,” factor 10 potentially broadens the scope of
the inquiry tremendously and opens a proceeding to many issues
not heretofore thought to be relevant by other courts.
64
The rule also lacks any requirement for a hearing. The
Advisory Committee’s reasoning that “[i]n some instances, a
65
hearing would serve no useful purpose or would be unnecessary”
is undoubtedly correct, particularly when recognition is strongly
indicated. However, a hearing would be a useful procedural
safeguard and an appropriate sign of respect if a decision not to
recognize a tribal court judgment or order is imminent. The
cumulative effect of the agnostic approach and the broad list of
factors, concluding with the apparently open-ended grant of
discretion in factor 10, is an extremely wide grant of discretion to
state trial courts that gives comparatively little guidance on how
that discretion should be exercised.
While some judges who are knowledgeable about Indian tribal
courts will appreciate that discretion, others may be uncomfortable
with the lack of guidance given by the Minnesota Rule. These
features, along with the lack of a hearing requirement, present a
risk that errors will occur. Because of this rule, some valid tribal
judgments may not be enforced. Non-enforcement will constitute
justice denied for some unlucky litigant.
(2) A court in the United States need not recognize a judgment of the
court of a foreign state if:
(a) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the action;
(b) the defendant did not receive notice of the proceedings in
sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(c) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(d) the cause of action on which the judgment was based, or the
judgment itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the United States or
of the State where recognition is sought;
(e) the judgment conflicts with another final judgment that is
entitled to recognition; or
(f) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement
between the parties to submit the controversy on which the judgment is
based to another forum.).
63. See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1997)
(suggesting that the question of a reciprocity requirement is better left to the
executive and legislative branches).
64. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.02(b).
65. Id. 10 advisory comm. cmt.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/5

14

Washburn and Thompson: A Legacy of Public Law 280: Comparing and Contrasting Minnesota’s
5WASHBURN

2004]

3/29/2005 2:48:21 PM

A LEGACY OF PUBLIC LAW 280

493

While errors can occur under any rule, one approach is to
draft a rule to insure that the risk of error is properly allocated. In
light of the broad discretion in the rule and the lack of a hearing, it
may be difficult for a losing party to create a record that
demonstrates error. Indeed, this rule seems uniquely designed to
make errors that demonstrate disrespect for tribal courts
unreviewable.
Given the risk of widespread ignorance about tribal courts,
one can make a strong argument that respect for tribal courts
justifies at least a modest presumption in favor of the regularity and
validity of tribal court proceedings. In light of the fact that federal
notions of due process have been imposed on tribal courts in much
the same way as they have been imposed on state courts, a
presumption that tribal court judgments are valid is sound; in
66
practice, tribal courts function much like state courts.
In sum, the Minnesota Rule’s provisions related to federal or
state statutory mandates are of limited assistance. In circumstances
in which recognition is discretionary, Minnesota Rule provides
broad discretion and little guidance. Naturally, judges who possess
awareness and familiarity with tribal courts are likely to view
judgments from tribal courts more favorably than judges who lack
that knowledge. The rule may well lead to arbitrariness in the
enforcement of tribal judgments, and such arbitrariness will be
difficult to review. The lack of firm guidance in the Minnesota
Rule may thus produce arbitrary outcomes and a lack of uniformity
in the recognition of tribal court rulings in Minnesota courts.
B. The Arizona Rules
67

The Arizona Rules took effect December 1, 2000; three years
prior to the promulgation of the Minnesota Rule. Like the
Minnesota Rule, the Arizona Rules were nearly a decade in
development.
Unlike the Minnesota Rule, which is divided into two basic
66. The Fourteenth Amendment and the great “Incorporation Controversy”
ultimately was resolved by several Supreme Court decisions imposing uniform
standards of various kinds of due process and procedure on state courts. The
Indian Civil Rights Act constituted Congress’s effort to impose the same kinds of
due process on tribal courts. For more on this, see Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal
Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403 (2004). The article discusses that
tribal courts have clearly been required to provide many fundamental procedural
rights for a longer time than state courts.
67. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1-7.
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sections (Rule 10.01: mandated recognition; and Rule 10.02:
discretionary recognition), the Arizona Rules consist of seven
different provisions, cast as Rules 1 through 7, that set forth
considerably more detail than the Minnesota Rule. The following
discussion will describe the Arizona Rules and highlight some of
the key differences between the Arizona and Minnesota rules.
1.

Presumption of Recognition of Tribal Judgments

The heart of the Arizona approach is Rule 5. It sets forth the
standard for the recognition of tribal court orders and judgments
68
in the Arizona courts. Rule 5 provides that tribal judgments “shall
be recognized and enforced by the courts of this state to the same
extent and shall have the same effect as any judgment, order, or
69
decree of a court of this state.” Unless a timely objection is filed,
the presumption of validity results in the recognition and
70
enforcement of the tribal court judgment.
In the event a timely objection is filed, Rule 5 sets forth two
71
72
mandatory and four discretionary considerations to guide courts.
The considerations are set forth as follows, with comparable
73
Minnesota Rule provisions footnoted:
Mandatory Considerations Following Objection. A tribal
judgment shall not be recognized and enforced if the
objecting party demonstrates to the court at least one of
the following:
1. The tribal court did not have personal or subject
74
matter jurisdiction.
75
2. The defendant was not afforded due process.
Discretionary Considerations Following Objection. The
superior court may, in its discretion, recognize and
enforce or decline to recognize and enforce a tribal
judgment on equitable grounds, including:
1. The tribal judgment was obtained by extrinsic
68. Id. 5.
69. Id. 5(a).
70. Id. 5(a), (b).
71. Id. 5(c).
72. Id. 5(d).
73. See MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.02(a); see also supra notes 61-62 and
accompanying text (laying out the Minnesota Rule).
74. Cf. 10.02(a) (Factor 3).
75. Cf. id. (Factor 6).
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76

fraud.
2. The tribal judgment conflicts with another final
77
judgment that is entitled to recognition.
3. The tribal judgment is inconsistent with the parties’
78
contractual choice of forum.
4. Recognition of the tribal judgment or the cause of
action upon which it is based is against fundamental
79
public policy of the United States or the State of
80
Arizona.
Both the Minnesota Rule and the Arizona Rules contain
provisions to ensure that a defendant was afforded due process and
that a tribal court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction
before its judgments will be enforced. Of the four discretionary
considerations in the Arizona Rules, two are comparable to
provisions found in the Minnesota Rule. The Minnesota Rule,
however, contains an additional five considerations, including
whether the tribal court is a “court of record,” whether the tribal
court has reciprocal rules for the recognition of state court
81
judgments, and an extremely broad general provision.
The inspiration for the Arizona Rules is obvious; it tracks
closely, in fact, nearly word-for-word, with the federal common law
82
rule regarding the recognition of tribal court judgments.
In
contrast, the Minnesota Rule departs substantially from this widely
used approach and charts a new course.
2.

Setting a Respectful Tone

Despite certain similarities between the two rules, the Arizona
Rules are decidedly more respectful toward tribal courts in other

76. Cf. id. (Factor 5).
77. No comparable provision exists in the Minnesota Rule, although the issue
could be addressed in Minnesota’s catchall Factor 10. See id. (Factor 10).
78. No comparable provision exists in the Minnesota Rule, although the issue
could be addressed in Minnesota’s catchall Factor 10. See id. (Factor 10).
79. Cf. id. (Factor 7).
80. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 5(c), (d).
81. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota
Rule).
82. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (describing the Hilton and
Restatement approaches to the recognition of foreign judgments); see also Wilson
v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997) (setting forth a standard for the
recognition and enforcement of tribal judgments in federal courts upon which the
Arizona Rules are based almost word-for-word).
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ways as well. The Arizona Rules offer two clarifications that are
lacking in the Minnesota Rule. For example, Arizona’s Rule 1
specifies that “[d]eterminations regarding recognition and
enforcement of a tribal judgment pursuant to these rules shall have
no effect upon the independent authority of that tribal
83
judgment.” It also notes that “[n]othing in these rules shall be
deemed or construed to expand or limit the jurisdiction either of
84
the State of Arizona or any Indian tribe.”
While these provisions are not strictly necessary, they serve two
important functions. First, by defining the limits of the rules, these
statements may be useful to judges and individuals who have little
or no experience in the area of Indian law or limited
understanding of the place of Indian tribal courts within the
American system. Second, in elucidating the Arizona Supreme
Court’s own understanding as to the authority of tribal courts, the
statements set a tone of respect for the courts of the “Third
85
Sovereign.” Inclusion of these statements in the very first rule
provision sets a respectful tone for the rest of the provisions. The
absence of similar statements in the Minnesota Rule produces a
different tone.
Just as Rule 1 starts out the Arizona recognition rules with a
respectful approach toward tribal courts, the concluding rule
86
provision implements respect in a practical manner. Rule 7,
which is unlike any provision to be found in the Minnesota Rule,
provides that when issues arise as to the validity of a tribal court
judgment, the district court “shall . . . attempt to resolve any issues
raised . . . by contacting the tribal court judge who issued the
87
judgment.” In other words, the Arizona Rules actually encourage
88
inter-sovereign judicial cooperation. While such a provision could
potentially cause friction when state court judges question the
judgments of the tribal court judges, it seems more likely to
produce
improved
communication,
understanding,
and
cooperation between state and tribal courts. The Minnesota Rule
83. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1.
84. Id.
85. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 1.
86. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 7.
87. Id.
88. While communication may not be advisable or even appropriate in all
cases, this rule constitutes recognition that many of the disputes in which such
issues will arise are local in nature and informal communication between judges
may be a good practical solution.
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would undoubtedly be improved if it promoted such respect and
cooperation.
3.

Detailed Filing Procedures

In many ways, the Arizona Rules are also more helpful to
89
litigants and judges than the Minnesota Rule. While Rule 2 is not
90
substantively different from provisions in the Minnesota Rule,
Rule 3 sets forth relatively detailed procedures for the recognition
91
and enforcement of tribal court orders and judgments. Rule 3
states that a “copy of any tribal judgment may be filed in the office
92
of the clerk of the superior court in any county of this state.” It
further provides instructions to the enforcing party on how to file
the tribal judgment, how to serve the responding party with notice
93
of the filing, and how to file proof of service.
Arizona Rule 4 continues in this helpful vein by explaining the
94
procedures for objections. Under Rule 4, “[a]ny objection to the
89. Rule 1 contains a provision similar to that of the Minnesota Rule
regarding recognition of tribal court orders and judgments where mandated by
state or federal statute. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the
similar Minnesota Rule provision). The Arizona Rules explicitly provide that
“[t]hese rules do not apply to tribal judgments for which federal law requires that
states grant full faith and credit recognition or for which state law mandates
different treatment.” 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1. In addressing
VAWA, the Minnesota Rule is somewhat more helpful than the Arizona Rules.
Moreover, the Advisory Committee comment in the Minnesota Rule notes the
relevant state and federal statutes. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT 10 advisory comm. cmt..
90. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 2. Rule 2 sets forth definitions
for the terms “tribal court” and “tribal judgment.” While the definitions are a bit
more specific than anything found in the Minnesota Rule, they are essentially
parallel to provisions of the Minnesota Rule. For instance, the Arizona Rules
definition of “tribal court,” while going into more detail, essentially includes the
courts of any federally recognized Indian tribe. Id. The Minnesota Rule also
contains the phrase “any federally recognized Indian tribe,” but it is not noted as
being a definition, and is only emphasized in the Advisory Committee comment.
MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.01. The Arizona Rules define “tribal judgment” as “any
final written judgment, decree or order of a tribal court duly authenticated in
accordance with the laws and procedures of the tribe or tribal court.” 17B ARIZ.
REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 2. The Minnesota Rule appears to contemplate a
similar definition, yet it is obscured by being included as one of the factors courts
may consider in determining whether to recognize a tribal court order or
judgment. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.02(a)(8) (stating “whether the order or
judgment is final under the laws and procedures of the rendering court . . . .”).
91. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 3.
92. Id. 3(a).
93. Id. 3(b).
94. Id. 5; see also supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text (discussing the
recognition of tribal judgments according to Rule 5).
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enforcement of a tribal judgment shall be filed within twenty (20)
days of service or of receipt of the notice . . . or within twenty-five
95
(25) days of the date of mailing, whichever last occurs.” The rule
further indicates that “[i]f an objection is filed within this time
period, the superior court may, in its discretion, set a time period
96
for replies and/or set the matter for hearing.”
Like the
97
Minnesota Rule, the Arizona Rules leave the decision of whether
98
to hold a hearing to the discretion of the court. If no objections
are timely filed, a tribal judgment is enforceable under the Arizona
99
Rules. In short, while the Minnesota Rule purports to set forth
procedures, the Arizona Rules actually create procedures. While
the Minnesota Rule provides procedures in the context of VAWA, it
100
provides none for other circumstances.
One final procedural difference is worth noting. Under
Arizona Rule 6, an Arizona court “shall stay enforcement of the
tribal judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal
101
expires, or the stay of execution expires or is vacated.”
This
provision applies to circumstances in which an appeal of the tribal
court judgment is pending or may be filed, or a stay of execution
102
has been ordered by the tribal court.
Although the Minnesota
Rule raises the issue of finality as one of the factors that may be
103
considered by the state court, it provides no guidance as to how
to proceed in circumstances in which the order is not final.
Nevertheless, the order ought to be enforced if and when it
becomes final. While a state court in Minnesota may have
104
discretion to stay enforcement in appropriate circumstances, the
Minnesota provision has the effect of making finality a substantive
and dispositive factor rather than a procedural hurdle.

95. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 4.
96. Id.
97. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.02(b); see also supra notes 64-65 and
accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota Rule provision making a hearing
optional).
98. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 4.
99. Id. 5.
100. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.01(b)(2). To be fair, the Arizona Rules eschew
any claim to applicability if a federal or state mandate is involved, so parties are
without guidance if the mandate statute fails to provide clear direction. See 17B
ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1.
101. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 6.
102. Id.
103. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.02(a)(8).
104. Id. 10.02.
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Accordingly, a Minnesota court judge may simply refuse to
recognize the tribal court order or judgment in such
circumstances.
In summary, the Arizona Rules are not only more respectful to
tribal courts, they are more detailed and, as a result, more helpful
to both litigants and judges. Part III of this article will describe and
compare the rulemaking processes in Arizona and Minnesota, in
the hopes of drawing some conclusions about the very different
105
results.
III. THE RULEMAKING PROCESS
During the latter half of the twentieth century, tribal courts
106
began to flourish. In cases such as Williams v. Lee, National Farmers
107
Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe, and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v.
108
the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly affirmed the
LaPlante,
legitimacy of tribal courts. And Congress, for its part, has not only
required state courts to grant full faith and credit to certain kinds
109
of tribal court judgments, it has supported tribal courts with
110
federal appropriations.
As federal support for tribal courts has increased, tribal courts
have developed, in the words of Justice O’Connor, by “leaps and
111
bounds.” Increased reservation commerce and populations have
105. See infra Part III.
106. 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
107. 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985).
108. 480 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1987).
109. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
110. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights urged Congress to increase the
funding of tribal courts in amounts equal to the funding provided to state courts.
See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 72-73 (1991).
While this has never been achieved, Congress responded more modestly in 1993
by enacting the Indian Tribal Justice Act. Pub. L. No. 103-176, § 2, 107 Stat. 2004
(1993) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3601) (indicating that “tribal justice systems are an
essential part of tribal governments and serve as important forums for ensuring
public health and safety and the political integrity of tribal governments”). In that
legislation, Congress also established an Office of Tribal Justice Support within the
Bureau of Indian Affairs and authorized annual appropriations up to $50 million
for assistance to tribal courts. See Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (codified at
25 U.S.C. §§ 3611-14, 3621(b)). Seven years later, in 2000, Congress enacted the
Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000. Pub. L. No. 106559, 114 Stat. 2778 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3651) (finding that “tribal justice
systems are an essential part of tribal governments and serve as important forums
for ensuring the health and safety and the political integrity of tribal
governments”).
111. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 1.
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112

increased the number of civil disputes heard in tribal courts.
And increased mobility on and off the reservation has created a
113
need for cross-border enforcement of judgments.
Recognizing the increasing number of issues related to tribal
courts, the Conference of Chief Justices of State Supreme Courts
began to look into the problems between state and tribal courts in
114
the late 1980s. Research by the National Center for State Courts
revealed that “jurisdictional disputes had arisen most frequently in
the areas of the Indian Child Welfare Act, domestic relations
(family law), contract law as well as taxation, hunting and fishing,
115
To develop approaches to address
and certain other areas.”
these issues, the Conference of Chief Justices selected Arizona,
Oklahoma, and Washington as pilot states to develop “model
116
approaches to consensus building” and report on them.
A. The Arizona Process
Toward this end, the Arizona Court Forum was created in
117
118
The Arizona
1989, and held its first meeting in early 1990.
Court Forum was originally composed of four state court leaders,
119
three tribal court officials, and a forum consultant. The Arizona
Court Forum held four meetings in 1990, all of which were open to
120
During that year, it also prepared a report on its
the public.
121
efforts, to be presented to the Conference of Chief Justices.
Because the original forum’s purpose was to identify issues,
develop potential problem-solving approaches, and ultimately
report their findings and recommendations to the Conference of
112.
113.
114.

Minnesota Petition, supra note 58, at 7.
Id.
ARIZONA COURT FORUM, STATE AND TRIBAL COURT INTERACTION: BUILDING
COOPERATION: AN ARIZONA PERSPECTIVE 4 (1991), available at http://supreme.
state.az.us/stfcf/handouts/StateTribal%20Court%20Interaction.pdf (last visited
Nov. 12, 2004) [hereinafter BUILDING COOPERATION].
115. Id.
116. Id. at 5.
117. Arizona Court Forum Chairman Michael C. Nelson’s Petition for Adoption of
Rules of Procedure for Recognition of Tribal Court Judgments, In re: Rules of Procedure
for
the
Recognition
of
Tribal
Court
Judgments,
available
at
http://supreme.state.az.us/
stfcf/handouts/Recognition%20of%20Judgements%20Petition.pdf (last visited
Nov. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Arizona Petition].
118. BUILDING COOPERATION, supra note 114, at 34.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Arizona Petition, supra note 117.
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122

Chief Justices, its initial scope was quite broad.
The issue of
recognition of tribal court judgments was only one of many issues
123
that the Arizona Court Forum addressed in its early years.
In
fact, the idea of a supreme court rule on recognition of tribal court
judgments was not yet on the horizon when the Arizona Court
Forum submitted its first report to the Conference of Chief Justices
124
in 1991.
Instead, early suggestions for approaches to the
recognition issue included intergovernmental agreements,
legislative action, and even establishing recommended procedural
guidelines for the tribal courts in order to ensure that their
125
While the idea of
judgments would be enforced in state court.
intergovernmental agreements remained a popular topic for
discussion in other areas, it appears to have been discounted early
on as an approach to the area of recognition of judgments simply
because of the sheer number of agreements that would be
126
required.
The idea of legislative action, while eventually
127
The Arizona Court
discarded, remained viable for several years.
Forum’s report even contained a model Uniform Enforcement of
128
State and Tribal Court Judgments Act.
Although the Arizona Court Forum later rejected some of its
initial ideas, other priorities remained. For example, educating
tribal and state court judges about the various jurisdictional issues
was an early and lasting priority. Increasing the interaction
between tribal and state court judges, making tribal ordinances and
court decisions more readily available, and ensuring that tribes had
access to Arizona law and various other resources were other key
129
priorities for the Arizona Court Forum.
One characteristic of the Arizona Court Forum that should be
noted was its openness to public comment. Since its earliest
130
meetings, the forum was open to the public. Beginning with the
122. See, e.g., BUILDING COOPERATION, supra note 114, at 34.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 13-33.
125. Id. at 34 (emphasis added). The last idea doesn’t appear to have been
discussed after the first meeting.
126. See Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting
(Oct. 20, 1990), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf (last visited Nov. 12,
2004).
127. See Arizona Petition, supra note 117 (stating that in 1995, an expanded and
newly organized forum decided not to pursue legislation).
128. BUILDING COOPERATION, supra note 114, app. E.
129. Id. app. A; see also id. at 34.
130. See id. app. A. While the presence of “guests” was not noted at the first
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second meeting, public comments were sought at the end of each
131
meeting. Written comments by the public were also sought as the
132
Arizona Court Forum’s report neared completion.
Despite so
much opportunity for public comment and the concomitant ease
with which controversy could arise, it appears that the Arizona
Court Forum received only one written comment (whose author
133
also enclosed a disputed parking ticket).
Furthermore, there
appears to have been only two instances of mild discord at forum
meetings. In one of these instances, a tribal court “guest” is
described as having taken “strong exception” to a discussion
134
regarding the “sophistication of the Navajo tribal courts.” In the
other instance, a law student “commented [that] there had been
some concern expressed by Salt River tribal council members who
were not asked to participate or provide input into Arizona Court
Forum procedure,” whereupon no less than three Arizona Court
135
Forum members attempted to allay these concerns.
Thus,
despite ample opportunity for public comment and the possibility
of resulting controversy, the Arizona Court Forum’s early meetings
seem to have passed uneventfully.
At a national conference sponsored by the Conference of
Chief Justices held in Seattle, Washington, from June 30 to July 1,
1991, Arizona, Oklahoma, and Washington presented their
136
reports.
Arizona’s report, entitled Building Cooperation, set forth
the Arizona Court Forum’s recommendations and rationale for
action in the areas of education, jurisdiction, intergovernmental
137
agreements, state legislation, and federal legislation.
The
appendices to the report provided minutes of the forum’s
meetings, profiles of Arizona tribes, sample intergovernmental
agreements, a list of Arizona cases involving jurisdiction which were
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, the model Uniform
Forum meeting, it was not unusual for up to 15 “guests” to be present at later
meetings, although most of those named appear to be members of the legal
community. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 34 (establishing a period for comment regarding the report).
133. Id. app. F.
134. Id. at 34.
135. Id. (establishing a period for comment regarding the report).
136. See, e.g., Tribal Court Clearinghouse, Building on Common Ground: A
National Agenda to Reduce Jurisdictional Disputes Between Tribal, State, and Federal
Courts, available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/articles/common.htm (last
visited Nov. 12, 2004).
137. BUILDING COOPERATION, supra note 114, at 9-33.
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Enforcement of State and Tribal Court Judgments Act, and a lone
138
public comment. Among the more specific recommendations in
the report was establishment of an Indian Law section of the
139
Arizona State Bar.
In fact, the Indian Law section held its
organizational meeting on November 8, 1990, even before the
140
recommendation was presented in Seattle.
In response to one of the report’s recommendations, the
Arizona legislature passed a groundbreaking statute in 1992 that
made tribal court involuntary commitment orders recognizable
141
and enforceable in state courts.
In 1994, the Arizona Supreme
Court adopted rules for the recognition of tribal court involuntary
142
commitment orders.
Thus, the Arizona Court Forum began
seeing the results of its efforts almost immediately.
Another general recommendation of the Arizona Court
Forum was the establishment of an ongoing colloquium of state,
143
federal, and tribal officials. As the forum continued with its work,
a permanent forum was established by Administrative Order of the
144
Arizona Supreme Court in 1994.
Chief judges of the Ninth
Circuit and the District Court of Arizona appointed judges to serve
145
The new forum was expanded to include
on the new forum.
federal members, and was renamed the State, Tribal & Federal
146
Court Forum (“Arizona Forum”).
In its new incarnation, the
Arizona Forum consisted of four federal members, six state
members, at least seven tribal members, one state bar member, and
147
two public members. The state, tribal, and public members serve
148
for two-year terms.
The next landmark event in the Arizona Rules process was the
149
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wilson v. Marchington in September of
138. Id. apps. A-F.
139. Id. at 17.
140. Id.
141. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-136 (1992).
142. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. INVOL. COMMITMENT ORDERS R. 1-6.
143. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum Website, at
http://supreme.state. az.us/stfcf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
144. Arizona Supreme Court Admin. Order, In re: Appointment of Members to
State, Tribal, and Federal Court Forum (No. 2001-70), available at
http://supreme. state.az.us/orders/admorder/orders01/2001-70.pdf (last visited
Nov. 12, 2004).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
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1997. This case set forth a common law standard for the
recognition and enforcement of tribal court judgments by the
150
federal courts.
The Arizona Forum discussed the case during its
June 1998 meeting and adopted a draft of proposed rules for the
recognition of tribal court judgments that echoed the Marchington
151
standard.
The proposed rules adopted Marchington’s
152
While Marchington was a
presumption in favor of recognition.
federal case, the forum noted that it “provides an indication of the
current common law which is useful to frame rules that implement
153
current Arizona common law.” Despite the fact that the Arizona
Forum agreed that the proposed rules, when redrafted, would serve
as the basis for the petition to the Supreme Court, no members of
154
the public made any comments when given the opportunity.
By the Arizona Forum’s next meeting, in December of 1998,
the Arizona Rules petition had been filed with the Supreme Court.
At this meeting, the forum discussed procedures for the
enforcement of tribal domestic violence orders, noting that they
155
were not covered by the rule.
In January of 1999, the Arizona
Supreme Court sought public comment on the Arizona Rules
156
Following the comment period, the Arizona Forum
petition.
157
authorized its chairperson to file a reply to the comments.
The
150. Id. at 810.
151. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting
(June 9, 1998), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf/98%20thru%2099/9806-09%20 minutes.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). It should be noted that the
Arizona Forum also discussed other issues during its meetings. Id. This article,
however, focuses only on those issues which relate to the recognition of tribal
court judgments.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. The Arizona Rules were not nearly as controversial as the Minnesota
Rule. The only real opposition was the Civil Practice Committee of the State Bar
Association, which was concerned that the effect of the rule went beyond current
law. County Attorneys were also somewhat concerned until the proposed rule was
amended to clarify that it only applied to civil cases. Other than that, the Arizona
Rules were simply not an area of concern. Telephone Interview with David
Withey, Chief Counsel, Administrative Office of Arizona Courts (Jul. 14, 2004).
155. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting
(Dec. 4, 1998), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf/98%20thru%2099/9908-04%20 minutes.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). The non-recognition of tribal
judgments doesn’t appear to have been as much of a problem in Arizona.
Telephone Interview with David Withey, supra note 154.
156. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting
(Dec. 4, 1998), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf/98%20thru%2099/9908-04%20 minutes.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
157. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting
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forum agreed to clarify that the rule applies to civil judgments only,
158
No additional
and agreed to a few other minor amendments.
159
changes were suggested.
At the Arizona Forum’s meeting on October 26, 1999, it was
reported that the Arizona Supreme Court would circulate the
petition to twenty-two practitioners and academics to comment on
160
the need for the rules and the court’s authority to adopt them.
David Withey, the Chief Counsel for the Arizona Supreme Court
Administrative Office of the Courts, and an active participant in the
161
Arizona Forum since its inception, would also submit a comment.
The forum discussed practical aspects of enforcing tribal court
162
judgments.
Members noted the availability of state court forms
on the Arizona Supreme Court’s website, as well as the availability
of WordPerfect versions of these forms suitable for tribal
163
modification.
An invitation to tribal courts to make their own
164
forms available on the website was also extended. Again, despite
opportunity for public comment, apparently no comments were
165
offered.
The petition was scheduled to be considered at the Arizona
166
Supreme Court’s Rules Agenda meeting in January of 2000.
However, the court postponed its consideration of the petition
until its next Rules Agenda meeting due to lack of response of
academics and experts from whom the Court had requested to
167
submit comments.
In the meantime, the Arizona Forum
discussed possible education efforts and the logistics of making
tribal codes and regulations available in some sort of centralized
(Aug. 4, 1999), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf (last visited Nov. 12,
2004).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting
(Oct. 26, 1999), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf/00%20thru%2004/
2000-02-25%20minutes.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting
(Feb. 25, 2000), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf/00%20thru%2004/
2000-02-25%20minutes.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). Apparently, no one,
including tribes, was very interested in the proposed rule. Telephone Interview
with David Withey, supra note 154.
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168

location.
It also heard reports from experts regarding the
enforcement of tribal judgments where mandated by federal
169
statute. While the recognition and enforcement of child support
orders was identified as not being a problem, the recognition and
enforcement of VAWA orders was identified as a significant
170
problem, despite the federal mandate.
Possible remedies
identified were intergovernmental agreements and the
171
standardization of forms and protocols.
Finally, at the Arizona Supreme Court’s May 2000 Rules
Agenda meeting, the Arizona Forum’s petition was approved with
172
some modifications.
More than a decade in the making, the
173
Arizona Rules became effective on December 1, 2000. The rules
tracked the Marchington standard for the recognition and
enforcement of tribal judgments closely, beginning with a
presumption of enforcement, and listing limited circumstances
174
under which enforcement may not occur.
They also set forth
careful procedures for the enforcement and recognition of tribal
175
court judgments.

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting (Jan.
19, 2001), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf/00%20thru%2004/200101-19%20 minutes.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). Indeed, the only significant
area of concern for the Arizona Supreme Court appears to have been whether the
rule was a reflection of current law, or whether it took a step beyond current law.
Telephone Interview with David Withey, supra note 154.
174. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Arizona Rules, as well as the Marchington
standard).
175. Id. It seems that the Arizona Rules translated immediately into action. At
the Arizona Forum’s meeting on January 19, 2001, David Withey reported that he
had already provided forms to state court clerks to use in processing tribal court
cases under the rule. Arizona State Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from
Meeting (Jan. 19, 2001), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf (last visited
Nov. 12, 2004). The clerks had decided that a statutory filing fee would apply. Id.
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176

While the process for proposing the Minnesota Rule was
177
modeled in some ways on the Arizona approach, the process
178
unfolded somewhat differently.
1.

Formation of a Working Group and Development of a Rule

It was not until the summer of 1996 that informal meetings
179
Thereafter, a group of tribal judges and lawyers
began.
approached Justice Sandra Gardebring of the Minnesota Supreme
Court about the possibility of establishing a committee to work on
180
the issues.
Justice Gardebring assisted in recruiting state court
181
The first meeting of the Tribal
judges from the various districts.
Court/State Court Forum (“Minnesota Forum”) took place on July
18, 1997, at the Prairie Island Mdewakanton Dakota Community
182
Tribal Court.
Unfortunately, Justice Gardebring departed the
Supreme Court in 1998, and the work of the forum was temporarily
183
suspended.
184
The Minnesota Forum resumed in May of 1999, but the loss
176. The Honorable Andrew M. Small kindly provided the authors with copies
of many of the files he accumulated during the rulemaking process. The rule
petition and many of the comments to the rule have been compiled on a CD-ROM
and are on file at the Minnesota State Law Library in the Minnesota Judicial
Center. CD-ROM, supra note 40. The Honorable Robert H. Schumacher and
Michael Johnson of the State Court Administration and General Rules Advisory
Committee also provided very helpful background information on the Minnesota
Rule.
177. Interview with Hon. Andrew M. Small, supra note 25; Interview with Hon.
Robert H. Schumacher, Judge, Minnesota Court of Appeals & Chair, Minnesota
Tribal Court/State Court Forum, in St. Paul, Minnesota (June 29, 2004).
178. While the Minnesota Forum began its work in the early 1990s, members
of the Minnesota legal community were not interested in working on the issue of
the recognition and enforcement of tribal court judgments. Interview with Hon.
Andrew M. Small, supra note 177.
179. Minnesota Petition, supra note 58.
180. Interview with Hon. Robert H. Schumacher, supra note 177.
181. Id. When asked about the qualifications of the state court judges who
were asked to serve on the Minnesota Forum, Judge Schumacher stated that he
himself had no experience with the issue of tribal court recognition prior to
serving as Chair of the Minnesota Forum. However, he had long been interested
in Indian Law, and in fact started a legal advice clinic for the Indian community in
Minneapolis’s Upper Midwest American Indian Center in the early 1970s.
182. Minnesota Petition, supra note 58, at 2.
183. State Court Committee on Tribal Court/State Court Forum, Minutes
from Meeting (May 6, 1999) (on file with author).
184. Id.
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of Justice Gardebring’s leadership had a distinct impact. Members
of the Minnesota Supreme Court decided that a rule regarding the
recognition of tribal court judgments should be pursued through
185
the legislature instead.
The supreme court also sought to
separate the Minnesota Forum into a tribal court committee and a
186
state court committee that would meet jointly only periodically.
Although it was technically split into two separate committees,
187
The forum
the Minnesota Forum continued to meet jointly.
identified several priorities: educating the public about tribal
courts, ensuring the quality of tribal court judges and procedures,
188
and pursuing “full faith and credit.”
Though developing a rule
for the recognition and enforcement of tribal court judgments was
189
a high priority, the process gathered momentum slowly until
2001. Between May and September of that year, the tribal councils
of many of the Minnesota tribes passed resolutions in support of
190
the state enforcement of tribal court orders.
In February of 2002, a Mille Lacs Tribal Court judge refused to
recognize a Minnesota state court judgment on the ground that the
Minnesota state courts do not grant reciprocity to Mille Lacs Tribal
191
Court orders and judgments.
This decision, like the Wilson v.
185. Id. Justice Stringer presented this approach to the Minnesota Forum. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.; see also Interview with Hon. Robert H. Schumacher, supra note 177. It
also continues to meet jointly. Id.
188. Interview with Hon. Robert H. Schumacher, supra note 177.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Bois Forte Reservation Tribal Council Resolution No. 142-2001
(May 10, 2001); Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe Resolution No. 01-130 (June 27,
2001); Upper Sioux Community Board of Trustees Resolution No. 33-2001 (Aug.
17, 2001); White Earth Tribal Council Resolution No. 001-01-023 (Aug. 20, 2001);
Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians Resolution No. 09-04-116-01 (Sept. 25, 2001);
see also RED WING REPUBLICAN EAGLE, More Harmony Sought Between Courts (Aug. 2,
2002), available at http://www.republican-eagle.com/main.asp?Search=1&Article
ID=14492&SectionID=40&SubSectionID=114&S=1 (last visited Nov. 12, 2004)
(reporting that the Prairie Island Tribal Council “‘unequivocally’ supports the
petition”). The President of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe (which includes six of
the eleven Minnesota tribes) stated later that “there is support among all Tribal
governments for the proposal.” Petition for Adoption of a Rule of Procedure for the
Recognition of Tribal Court Orders and Judgment: Hearing Before the Minnesota Supreme
Court, No. CX-89-1863 (Minn. Oct. 29, 2002) (testimony of Chairman Norman
Deschampe).
191. Household Fin. Serv. v. Weyaus, No. 01-CV-546, slip op. at 6 (Mille Lacs
Band Ct. of Cent. Jurisdiction, Feb. 4, 2002) (explaining that in order for the
tribal court to recognize a judgment from another jurisdiction, tribal ordinance
requires courts of other jurisdictions to “have enacted a full faith and credit
provision in their Constitution or Statutes or on a case-by-case basis . . . granted
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Marchington decision in Arizona, served as a trigger that drew
attention to the recognition issue.
Barely two months later, on April 11, 2002, a delegation of
tribal court and state court members of the Minnesota Forum met
with Chief Justice Kathleen Blatz and Justice Edward Stringer of the
Minnesota Supreme Court to present their Petition for Adoption of
192
a Rule of Procedure for the Recognition of Tribal Court Orders.
The proposed rule established a presumption of validity and
enforcement which could be overcome by a showing that:
1) the tribal court lacked personal or subject matter
jurisdiction; or
2) the order or judgment was obtained by fraud, duress,
or coercion; or
3) the order or judgment was not obtained through a
process that afforded fair notice and a fair hearing; or
4) the order or judgment is not final under the laws and
procedures of the rendering court, unless the order is a
non-criminal order for the protection or apprehension of
an adult, juvenile or child, or another type of temporary,
193
emergency order.
The proposed rule also contained procedural requirements
for the enforcement of money judgments and emergency orders, as
well as a specification that the rule would apply neither to orders
where enforcement is mandated by statute, nor to criminal orders
194
of tribal courts.
Justices Blatz and Stringer referred the Petition to the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on General Rules
of Practice (“Advisory Committee”). The Advisory Committee
would review the rule and make further recommendations to the
court. At this point, opposition began to appear. On May 22, 2002,
the Advisory Committee held a public hearing on the proposed
rule. Several individuals complained that they learned of this
hearing only by publication the day before the hearing and, as a
result, were unable to attend the meeting.
One of these
individuals, a Minnesota Court of Appeals judge, expressed his
full faith and credit to judicial determinations” of the Mille Lacs tribal court).
192. Letter from Lenor A. Scheffler, Partner, Best & Flanagan L.L.P., to Philip
Frickey, Richard W. Jennings Professor of Law, University of California School of
Law (May 1, 2002) (on file with author); see also Minnesota Petition, supra note 58.
193. Minnesota Petition, supra note 58, at A-1.
194. Id. at A-2, A-3.
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opposition to the rule by letter, and particularly questioned the
Minnesota Forum’s assertion that the proposed rule had
195
unanimous support.
Another of these individuals, William J.
Lawrence of the Native American Press/Ojibwe News, also voiced
opposition to the rule, complaining that some of the Minnesota
Forum meetings were closed to the public and that he and other
rule opponents had been prohibited from voicing their concerns at
196
While it is not clear how much effect
public forum meetings.
these individuals had on the Advisory Committee’s ultimate views,
the committee noted concerns about the allegations regarding the
197
lack of opportunity for public comment.
Following the Advisory Committee hearing, several
developments occurred. Two significant changes were made to the
rule. First, a reciprocity element, requiring tribes to recognize state
court orders before their orders would be recognized in state court,
198
was added.
Then, following a request from the Conference of
199
Chief Judges, a due process reference was also added. While the
notice and fair hearing elements of due process were part of the
rule as originally proposed, this amendment broadened
consideration of due process issues. In addition, the Minnesota
Forum responded in writing to some of the concerns raised by the
200
Committee in its hearing on May 22, 2002, and filed an amended
195. Letter from Hon. R. A. Randall, Judge, Minnesota Court of Appeals to
Hon. Robert Schumacher, Judge, Minnesota Court of Appeals (May 22, 2002).
While it is true that the proposed rule may not have had the unanimous support of
the citizens of the State of Minnesota, it did have the unanimous support of the
Forum members, which was the assertion contained in the Petition. Minnesota
Petition, supra note 58, at 2.
196. Affidavit of William J. Lawrence, Publisher, NATIVE AMERICAN
PRESS/OJIBWE NEWs (May 22, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40). While the
Minnesota Forum meetings held on tribal land were closed to the public, those
held on state land were open to the public. Indeed, opponents of the proposal
attended the meetings. Interview with Hon. Robert H. Schumacher, supra note
177.
197. Interview with Michael B. Johnson, Senior Legal Counsel, State Court
Administration & Staff of Advisory Committee, in St. Paul, Minnesota (July 1,
2004). The Committee also considered some of the points made by the rule’s
opponents. Recommendations of Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Committee on
General Rules of Practice (Aug. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Advisory Comm. Report I].
198. The reciprocity element was added on May 22, 2002. Amended Petition for
Adoption of a Rule of Procedure for the Recognition of Tribal Court Orders and Judgments
(June 26, 2002) [hereinafter Amended Petition].
199. The due process reference was added on June 26, 2002. Amended Petition,
supra note 198.
200. Letter from Hon. Andrew M. Small, Associate Justice, Prairie Island
Mdewakanton Dakota & Lower Sioux Communities to Hon. Edward C. Stringer,
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201

petition.
Meanwhile, several influential groups registered their
opposition to the rule. The first group to do so was the Minnesota
Sheriff’s Association Board of Directors, which recommended
rejection of the proposed rule and referral of the issue to the
202
legislature.
The second group to register its opposition was the
Minnesota County Attorney’s Association, which complained that
the rule was overbroad, that the issues should be addressed by the
legislature instead, that the rule did not address immunity for state
and local officials, and that it would result in great financial costs to
203
The Minnesota State Bar Association
the State and counties.
Court Rules and Administration Committee also weighed in with a
recommendation that the recognition of tribal court orders and
judgments should be pursued by some means, but that the most
appropriate action would be to integrate the terms of the proposed
204
rule into existing rules and statutes.
On August 19, 2002, the Advisory Committee issued its
205
report.
The Committee described the proposed rule as
mandating full faith and credit for tribal court judgments, with very
206
More specifically, the committee believed
limited exceptions.
that the presumption of enforcement, combined with what it
perceived as a narrow list of exceptions, made “aspects of comity
either mandatory or, at least, presumptively mandatory, in contrast
207
to the traditionally discretionary nature of comity.”
2.

Public Comments on the Proposed Rule

After receiving the Advisory Committee’s report, the
Minnesota Supreme Court scheduled a hearing for October 29,
208
It requested written comments on or before October 15,
2002.
Chair, General Rules of Practice Committee (July 5, 2002).
201. Amended Petition, supra note 198.
202. Letter from Larry Podany, Executive Director, Minnesota Sheriffs’
Association to Advisory Comm. (Aug. 5, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40).
203. Letter from Doug Johnson et al., Minnesota County Attorneys Association
to Hon. Edward C. Stringer, Chair, Advisory Comm. (Aug. 6, 2002).
204. Letter from Mark H. Gardner, Co-Chair, Minnesota State Bar Association
Court Rules and Administration Comm. to Advisory Comm. (Aug. 14, 2002).
205. Advisory Comm. Report I, supra note 197.
206. Interview with Michael B. Johnson, supra note 197.
207. Advisory Comm. Report I, supra note 197, at 4.
208. Order for Hearing to Consider Petition for Adoption of a Rule of Procedure for the
Recognition of Tribal Court Orders and Judgments, No. CX-89-1863 (Minn. Aug. 2002).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 5
5WASHBURN

3/29/2005 2:48:21 PM

512

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
209

[Vol. 31:2
210

2002,
and received numerous public comments.
The
comments fell generally into two groups: those in support and
those opposed.
a.

Rule Supporters

As might have been expected, many individuals and
organizations from the Indian legal community supported the rule.
Among those were the Minnesota American Indian Bar Association
211
212
(“MAIBA”),
the Indian Child Welfare Law Center,
law
213
professors from all four Minnesota law schools, and the Northern
214
Several of these groups
Plains Tribal Judicial Institute.
emphasized the need for the rule. The Indian Child Welfare Law
Center, for example, described five recent cases in which children
and teenagers faced potentially dangerous situations because of
215
non-recognition of a tribal court order.
MAIBA similarly noted
that “state courts have not consistently or effectively enforced”
tribal court orders, and asserted the need for some uniformity in
216
this area, which the rule could provide.
MAIBA also argued, as
did the Northern Plains Tribal Judicial Institute, that parties should
not be able to re-litigate issues that had already been decided in a
217
lawful forum.
The law professors pointed out that the scope of
209. Id.
210. The Court received nearly 500 pages of material, which is available on
CD-ROM at the Minnesota State Law Library in the Minnesota Judicial Center.
The comments are a monument to participatory government. Some comments
were drafted by attorneys, others by laypeople. The comments cover a wide range
of perspectives and subjects, some seemingly tangential to the issue.
211. Letter from Eileen J. Strejc, President, Minnesota American Indian Bar
Association, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Oct. 14,
2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40).
212. Letter from Heidi A. Drobnick, Executive Director, Indian Child Welfare
Center, to Fredrick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Oct. 14, 2002)
(CD-ROM, supra note 40).
213. Author Kevin Washburn submitted comments jointly with Professor Eric
Janus (William Mitchell College of Law), Professor Mary Jo Brooks-Hunter
(Hamline University School of Law) and Professor Scott Taylor (University of St.
Thomas). Written Statement by Law Professors Urging the Adoption of a Rule of
Procedure for the Recognition of Tribal Court Orders and Judgments in State
Courts (Oct. 15, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40) [hereinafter Law Professor’s
Statement].
214
Letter from B.J. Jones, Director, Northern Plains Tribal Judicial Institute, to
Minnesota Supreme Court (filed Oct. 15, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40).
215. Letter from Heidi A. Drobnick, supra note 212.
216. Letter from Eileen J. Strejc, supra note 211.
217. Id.; Letter from B.J. Jones, supra note 214.
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such a rule was limited because of the limited nature of tribal
jurisdiction, but that the need for the rule was great in the cases in
218
which it would apply.
They also provided background on the
219
development of tribal courts.
Other organizations expressing support for the rule were the
Minnesota Department of Human Services and Mid-Minnesota
220
Legal Assistance.
Both of these organizations, working directly
with impoverished tribal members, could be expected to encounter
issues surrounding the recognition of tribal court orders on a fairly
221
regular basis.
Mid-Minnesota Legal Assistance pointed out that
the rule would improve efficiency and noted that tribal judges are
222
well qualified.
In addition to tribal judges, two individuals from the judicial
community who provided comments were Dennis J. Murphy, Chair
of the Administration Committee of the Conference of Chief
Judges, and Robert D. Walker, a trial court judge for the District
223
Particularly strong
Court of Martin County in Minnesota.
support came from the Minnesota Supreme Court’s own
Implementation Committee on Multicultural Diversity and Racial
224
Fairness in the Courts.
The Implementation Committee stated
that the rule would help to combat “general ignorance in the legal
community about issues of tribal court jurisdiction, sovereignty and

218. See Law Professor’s Statement, supra note 213, at 1.
219. Id. at 2-3.
220. Letter from Wayland Campbell, Director, Child Support Enforcement
Division, Minnesota Department of Human Services, to Hon. Kathleen Blatz,
Chief Justice, Minnesota Supreme Court (Oct. 15, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note
40); Letter from Jeremy Lane, Executive Director, Mid-Minnesota Legal
Assistance, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Oct. 26,
2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40).
221. Letter from Jeremy Lane, supra note 220.
222. Id.
223. Letter from Hon. Dennis J. Murphy, Chief Judge, Ninth Judicial District,
District Court of Minnesota, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate
Courts (Oct. 15, 2002) (expressing a desire to appear before the supreme court to
support the conference of the Full Faith and Credit Proposal) (CD-ROM, supra
note 40); Letter from Robert D. Walker, Judge, Fifth Judicial District, District
Court of Minnesota, to Hon. Kathleen Blatz, Chief Justice, Minnesota Supreme
Court (Nov. 4, 2002) (supplementing the oral presentation made at the Minnesota
Supreme Court hearing in support of the Full Faith and Credit Proposal) (CDROM, supra note 40).
224. Letter from Bridget Gernander, Project Specialist, Court Services Divison,
State Court Administrators Office, Minnesota Supreme Court, to Frederick
Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Oct. 11, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note
40).
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225

autonomy.”
The committee asserted that the rule would help to
educate the judiciary and the bar, would improve the relationship
between state and tribal courts, and would make Native Americans
safer overall, an important priority in light of the large Native
226
American population in Minnesota.
Finally, Brian Melendez, a member of the Advisory Committee,
which had advised against the rule, submitted a comment in
227
support of the rule.
In particular, he criticized the recurring
argument by many rule opponents that the legislature is the proper
228
forum for the recognition issue.
If the legislature did not
approve of the Minnesota Rule, he pointed out, it was free to
229
legislate.
b.

Rule Opponents

Opposition to the rule created unlikely bedfellows. Among
the most vocal opponents were individual Native Americans who
expressed the view that tribal courts were in some way
incompetent. For example, a member of the Lower Sioux
community opposed the rule because she felt the tribal courts were
230
plagued by “favoritism, nepotism, and inefficiency.”
A self231
described documentary film producer raised similar concerns, as
232
did Indian journalists with the Native American Press/Ojibwe News.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Petition for Adoption of a Rule of Procedure for the Recognition of Tribal Court
Orders and Judgment: Hearing Before the Minnesota Supreme Court, No. CX-89-1863
(Minn. Oct. 29, 2002) (statement of Brian Melendez, Member of the Advisory
Committee on the General Rules of Practice dated Oct. 15, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra
note 40) [hereinafter Minnesota Petition Hearing].
228. See id.
229. Id.
230. Id. (affidavit of Maxine V. Eidsvig dated Oct. 15, 2002).
231. Letter from Sheldon Wolfchild, Producer and Spokeman for the “New
Buffalo” Elders, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Oct. 14,
2002) (requesting time to speak at the hearing and that the Minnesota Supreme
Court deny the Petition) (CD-ROM, supra note 40). Sheldon Wolfchild is
producer of a documentary “New Buffalo” that apparently dealt with enrollment
issues of a small wealthy tribe, the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community. See
id.
232. Minnesota Petition Hearing, supra note 227 (statement of Clara NiiSka
dated May 22, 2002 and supplemental oral testimony filed Nov. 6, 2002). NiiSka’s
comments apparently were based primarily on a personal experience with a Red
Lake tribal court. Id. Ms. NiiSka’s publisher, William J. Lawrence, was also a vocal
opponent of the rule. Minnesota Petition Hearing, supra note 227 (statement of
William J. Lawrence dated May 22, 2002).
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Many of the comments reflected the feelings of individual Indian
litigants who were disgruntled following previous tribal court
proceedings.
Aligned with these individual Indians were citizens groups that
oppose tribal courts and other exercises of tribal sovereignty, such
as Citizens for Lawful Government, a citizen’s group located near
the White Earth Chippewa Reservation, and Proper Economic
Resource Management (“PERM”), an organization that has
supported unsuccessful federal litigation with the Mille Lacs Band
233
of Ojibwe over reservation boundaries.
PERM noted the lack of
234
Opposition was
separation of powers in tribal governments.
registered as well by state and local government officials, such as
Frank Corteau, a Mille Lacs County Commissioner, and Sondra
235
Erickson, State Representative of Minnesota District 17A.
Representative Erickson cited a lack of information about tribal
courts and questioned whether they are independent, whether they
236
uphold civil rights, and the scope of tribal jurisdiction.
Some of
the mainstream organizations that had previously made their
237
opposition to the rule known also filed comments.

233. See Randy V. Thompson, Supreme Court Adopts PERM’s Argument on Tribal
Court Judgements [sic], at http://www.perm.org/articles/a180.html (last visited
Nov. 12, 2004).
234. Id.
235. CD-ROM, supra note 40.
236. Letter from Sondra Erickson, Minnesota State Representative District
17A, Minnesota House of Representatives, to Hon. Kathleen Blatz, Chief Justice,
Minnesota Supreme Court (Oct. 14, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40).
237. The Minnesota State Bar Association Court Rules and Administration
Committee reiterated its suggestion that the provisions of the rule be integrated
into existing rules and statutes. Letter from Mark Gardner, Co-Chair, Minnesota
State Bar Association Court Rules and Administration Committee, to Minnesota
Supreme Court (Oct. 14, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40). Minnesota State Bar
Association Chairman John Duckstad, however, testified in favor of the rule.
Minnesota Petition Hearing, supra note 227. The Minnesota County Attorneys
Association reiterated its concern about financial burdens to the state and
counties, and again asserted that the rule was overbroad, and should be addressed
through the legislative process. Letter from John Kingrey, Executive Director,
Minnesota County Attorneys Association, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota
Appellate Courts (Oct. 15, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40) (requesting to speak at
the hearing against the proposal). The Minnesota Sheriffs’ Association also
repeated its position that the issue should be referred to the legislature. Letter
from Larry Podany, Executive Director, Minnesota Sheriffs’ Association, to
Minnesota Supreme Court, Rules Advisory Committee (July 11, 2002) (CD-ROM,
supra note 40).
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The Hearing

The Minnesota Supreme Court public hearing took place on
October 29, 2002. In addition to the written comments, the court
238
At the
considered the oral testimony of selected individuals.
hearing, Chief Justice Blatz indicated that the court would accept
239
additional written comments on the proposed rule.
In the
month of November, 2002, several individuals and organizations
240
submitted further written materials.
Rule supporters attempted
241
to clarify some of the issues raised during the hearing.
Hennepin County Judge Robert A. Blaeser responded to
242
several concerns regarding the rule.
Judge Blaeser first noted
that many of the opponents of the rule had personal issues with
their tribal courts, but that the rule was set up with safeguards so
that if their complaints were legitimate, litigants would be
243
protected.
He also responded to concerns about the overbreadth of the rule by noting that tribal court jurisdiction is already

238. Those testifying were: Hon. Robert H. Schumacher, Minnesota Court of
Appeals; Hon. Henry M. Buffalo, Jr., Tribal Court of the Shakopee Mdewakanton
Sioux Community; Hon. Robert Blaeser, Fourth Judicial District; David Herr,
Advisory Committee; Jon Duckstad, President of MSBA; Bill Lawrence, Native
American Press/Ojibwe News; Randy V. Thompson, Nolan, MacGregor &
Thompson; Laura Guthrie, Citizens for Lawful Government; Earl Mauss, Cass
County Attorney; Kevin K. Washburn, University of Minnesota Law School;
Sheldon Wolfchild, documentary producer; Jackie CrowShoe, Shakopee Child
Welfare Officer; Clara NiiSka, Native American Press/Ojibwe News; Norman
Deschampe, President of Minnesota Chippewa Tribe; and George Soule, Bowman
and Brooke L.L.P.. Minnesota Petition Hearing, supra note 227. Apparently not
everyone who wanted to was able to testify because of time constraints. Clara
NiiSka, Minnesota Supreme Court Rejects Proposed ‘Full Faith and Credit’ Rule, NATIVE
AMERICAN PRESS/OJIBWE NEWS (Mar. 7, 2003), available at http://www.presson.net/articles/3-7court_rejects_rule.html (last visited June 21, 2004)
(subscription required to view article online). Minnesota State Bar Association
Chairman John Duckstad, however, testified in favor of the rule. Minnesota Petition
Hearing, supra note 227.
239. Minnesota Petition Hearing, supra note 227.
240. Having learned that the Petition had not cited the new Arizona Rules, the
author submitted additional materials, including a copy of the Arizona Rules,
foreshadowing the subject of this article. See Letter from Kevin K. Washburn,
Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School, to Frederick Grittner,
Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Nov. 1, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40).
241. Minnesota Petition Hearing, supra note 227.
242. Letter from Judge Robert A. Blaeser, Judge, Fourth Judicial District, to
Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Nov. 1, 2002) (CD-ROM,
supra note 40).
243. Id.
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244

limited.
Finally, he stated that the legislature is not the proper
forum for this issue because the recognition of tribal court
judgments occurs entirely within the judicial system, and the
legislature is subject to political pressures that would interfere with
245
the process of reasoned analysis.
Attorney Vanya Hogen of Faegre & Benson addressed several
246
other concerns.
In response to the idea that tribal courts are
somehow incompetent, she noted that each of the tribal courts in
Minnesota possesses “established rules of procedure, law-trained
247
judges, and [renders] decisions that are available to the public.”
Hogen also urged the court to “recognize much of the opposition
for what it is: allegations of disgruntled litigants and accusations by tribal
248
political dissenters.”
Finally, the Minnesota Forum responded to several of the
249
major issues.
It noted that the proposed rule did not constitute
substantive law, but simply recognized traditional principles of
250
The forum also listed the statutes, rules, and court
comity.
251
decisions regarding the issue in the various states.
On March 5, 2003, the Supreme Court rejected the rule as
proposed, and ordered the Advisory Committee “to consider rules
to provide a general framework for the recognition and
enforcement of tribal orders and judgments where there is an
252
existing legislative basis for doing so.” An attorney, Randy V.
Thompson, claimed credit for the proposed rule’s defeat on behalf
of his clients, including Native American Press publisher William
253
Lawrence and PERM.

244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Letter from Vanya Hogen, Attorney, Faegre & Benson L.L.P., to Frederick
Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Nov. 4, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note
40).
247. Id.
248. Id. (emphasis in original).
249. Letter from Judge Henry M. Buffalo, Jr., Chair, Minnesota Tribal Court
Association, and Judge Robert H. Schumaker, Chair, State Court Committee,
Tribal Court/State Court Forum, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota
Appellate Courts (Nov. 5, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Mark A. Cohen, Enforcement Proposal for Tribal Courts Rejected, MINN. LAW.,
Mar. 10, 2003, at 1.
253. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 233.
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A New Rule

In April, 2003, Judge Small reported to the Advisory
Committee that in the month since the court’s order regarding the
rule, the Minnesota Forum had received reports of problems
254
regarding both VAWA and ICWA.
Judge Small encouraged the
255
On September 17,
Advisory Committee to reconsider the rule.
2003, the Advisory Committee issued its final report in which it
256
included its recommended version of the rule. The new proposal
was nearly identical to the Minnesota Rule as it would ultimately be
257
In its report, the
approved by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Advisory Committee admitted that its new proposed rule was
258
largely hortatory in nature.
Two days later, the Supreme Court
solicited comments on the new proposed rule, to be filed no later
259
than November 3, 2003.
Responding to that invitation, the
Minnesota Forum praised the Advisory Committee’s efforts, and
260
The most
suggested amendments to the new proposed rule.
important of these suggestions was to include in Rule 10.01(b)(1) a
direct reference to other state and federal statutes mandating
261
recognition of tribal court orders and judgments.
On December 11, 2003, the Minnesota Supreme Court
adopted a rule which is virtually identical to that proposed by the
262
Advisory Committee.
The rule became effective on January 1,
263
2004.

254. Letter from Hon. Andrew M. Small, Judge, Lower Sioux Community in
Minnesota Tribal Court Judgment, to Michael B. Johnson, Staff Attorney, Advisory
Committee (Apr. 11, 2003).
255. Id.
256. Recommendations of Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Committee on
General Rules of Practice (Sept. 17, 2003).
257. Id. at 4-6.
258. Id. at 4.
259. Order for Hearing to Consider Petition for Adoption of a Rule of Procedure for the
Recognition of Tribal Court Orders and Judgments, No. CX-89-1863 (Minn. Aug. 2002).
260. Letter from Hon. Andrew Small, Judge, Tribal Court/State Court Forum,
to Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Nov. 3, 2003) (CDROM, supra note 40).
261. Id.
262. The supreme court did not adopt any of the suggestions made by the
Minnesota Tribal Court/State Court Forum.
263. See MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.
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IV. THE LEGACY OF PUBLIC LAW 280
Given that Minnesota state and tribal judges began with a
proposal similar to Arizona’s and used a similar process to evaluate
the proposal, how did Arizona and Minnesota reach such different
results? The answer could be explained by various factors, such as
the different level of leadership on the issue at the state level in the
two states, the existence of strong federal judicial leadership in the
Arizona process (which was absent in the Minnesota process), or
even the different characteristics of tribal courts in the two states.
While each of these factors will be discussed briefly, the best answer
likely involves a 1953 statute called Public Law 280, and its
enduring legacy in Minnesota.
A. Public Law 280
In 1953, Congress enacted a law that shifted certain broad264
ranging power over Indian reservations to certain states.
Commonly referred to as Public Law 280, this law gave states the
265
power to exercise criminal jurisdiction and civil adjudicatory
266
authority over Indian reservations.
Public Law 280 was an unprecedented extension of state power
over Indians on Indian reservations and a reflection of the official
federal Indian policy of the time, a period that has since become
267
known as the “Termination Era.”
The termination policy that
Public Law 280 embodied reflected Congress’s long term design to
terminate the special relationship that Indian tribes had with the
United States, end tribal governance, and subject individual
268
Indians, like other Americans, to the general laws of the states.
After the enactment of Public Law 280, the courts of the
designated states possessed the power to exercise criminal
jurisdiction on Indian reservations as well as “jurisdiction over civil
causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties
264. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90 (codified in scattered
sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
265. Id. § 2.
266. Id. § 4.
267. See generally CAROLE GOLDBERG, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL
AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (1997). Professor Goldberg is the leading expert on Public
Law 280; the book includes law review articles published over a span of twenty five
years on the subject. Id.
268. See generally RENNARD STRICKLAND ET AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 152-53, 170-77 (1982).
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269

. . . .” As a result, state courts were available to litigants even for
disputes between Indians on a reservation.
Public Law 280 did not apply to reservations in Arizona and
several other states, but it did apply to most of the reservations in
270
Minnesota.
The difference in the legal regime in Arizona and
Minnesota accomplished by Public Law 280 is striking. In Williams
271
v. Lee, a case that arose in Arizona shortly after the enactment of
Public Law 280, the Arizona courts served as the forum for a simple
dispute over the sale of goods between a non-Indian seller and an
Indian consumer arising on the Navajo Reservation in northern
272
Arizona. In adjudicating the dispute, the Arizona Superior Court
273
ruled for the plaintiff and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed.
274
The Indian defendants then sought certiorari.
In a terse and sharply worded opinion, the U.S. Supreme
275
Court reversed the Arizona Supreme Court. Noting the fact that
the tribe has “greatly improved its legal system through increased
276
expenditures and better-trained personnel,” the Court held that
“to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine
the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence
277
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”
Thus, in the absence of Public Law 280 authority or other
authority conferred on states by Congress, the Supreme Court was
fiercely protective of the authority of tribal courts. In later cases,
the Supreme Court continued to rebuff attempts by Arizona
278
authorities to exercise state power on Indian reservations.
In
contrast to the independence of tribal courts and tribal
governments in Arizona, Public Law 280 allowed broad intrusions
of state power on Indian reservations in Minnesota and other
states.
Public Law 280 also insured that even in the absence of a tribal
269. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2000).
270. Id. The states where it applied immediately were California, Minnesota
(except the Red Lake Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Id. It was
later extended to Alaska and other states. Id.
271. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
272. Id.
273. Williams v. Lee, 319 P.2d 998 (1958).
274. Williams, 358 U.S. at 218.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 222.
277. Id. at 223.
278. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973);
Warren Trading Post v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
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court, there was a forum in state courts to resolve disputes between
279
Given the existence of the state court
Indians on tribal lands.
forum for most of the reservations in Minnesota, tribal courts were
not needed to resolve disputes; from a purely legal standpoint, they
280
could be considered “optional.”
The history of tribal courts in
Minnesota suggests that this may have been the view of tribal
governments. Most of the active tribal courts in Minnesota were
281
not founded until after 1978.
In creating state judicial authority on Indian reservations,
Public Law 280 not only effectively stunted the development of
tribal judicial systems; it also had other side effects, including
preventing an environment of respect for tribal courts from
developing. In Arizona, where state authorities repeatedly sought
to exercise authority on Indian reservations, they were consistently
rebuffed in a steady procession of U.S. Supreme Court cases that
likely had the effect of embarrassing and, ultimately, educating
Arizona officials. The protectiveness of the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts created a respectful environment in which
tribal courts could operate side-by-side with state courts.
In contrast, in Minnesota, state courts have routinely been able
282
to exercise substantial—and lawful—authority on Indian lands.
The pervasive influence and power of the state on Indian
reservations has made the remaining power of Indian tribes
comparatively less substantial and, to some people, less legitimate.
It would be anathema to a Navajo to prefer being hauled
before a state court instead of a tribal court. Thus, the Arizona
283
Rules had little or no opposition from Indian people.
The
279. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 4, 67 Stat. 588-90 (codified in scattered
sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
280. From a tribal government and policy standpoint, culturally appropriate
dispute resolution processes might not be considered “optional.”
281. According to literature describing the tribal courts in Minnesota that was
provided to the Minnesota Supreme Court with the petition for the recognition
rule, the tribal court of the Bois Forte Band of Chippewa was established in 1947,
the White Earth Band in 1978, the Mille Lacs Band in 1983, the Shakopee
Mdewakanton Sioux Community in 1988, the Lower Sioux Indian Community in
1993, and the Upper Sioux Indian Community in 1994. Minnesota Petition, supra
note 58, at 3.
282. Even Minnesota authorities have been corrected by the U.S. Supreme
Court when they have attempted to overstep their bounds. See Bryan v. Itasca
County, Minn., 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (stating Public Law 280 does not include the
power to tax Indian property on Indian reservations). This has been a rare event,
however, because state authority is fairly broad.
283. Telephone Interview with David Withey, supra note 154.
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Minnesota Rule, in contrast, faced opposition from members of
Indian tribes, in some cases apparently because they were
284
disgruntled litigants in tribal court disputes.
While tribal courts
have long been established and long been active in Arizona, they
are generally newer in Minnesota and apparently even Indian
people are not completely convinced of their legitimacy.
There are other differences between the tribal courts in
Arizona and Minnesota. Arizona’s tribal courts are perhaps more
well-established than the tribal courts in Minnesota. The Navajo
285
Nation alone, for example, has a population of over 180,000, and
286
The size of this
its courts handle well over 50,000 cases a year.
judicial system creates different judicial dynamics. In Arizona, the
tribal courts are a key component of the provision of justice within
the state. Absent the tribal courts, the Arizona state courts might
be forced to re-litigate thousands of cases. Minnesota does not
287
have any tribes that large, nor any tribal courts with dockets that
extensive.
Some of the opponents to the Minnesota Rule criticized tribal
courts by noting alleged conflicts of interest because some of the
tribal judges serve part-time as judges and part-time as attorneys in
288
other tribal courts.
The lack of a full-time tribal judicial class in
Minnesota is both a blessing and a curse. Judicial independence
and authority surely benefits from a class of judges who do not
practice as attorneys in other contexts. Indeed, full-time judges
attain a status of apparent impartiality that practicing lawyers can
never fully obtain, at least while remaining in the fray as an
advocate. On the other hand, few of the small tribes in Minnesota
have caseloads that warrant a full-time judiciary. Like some state
and even federal magistrate judges, some tribal judges serve only
part-time. Having a judge who also moonlights as an attorney in
other courts is not ideal, but it reflects one advantage of part-time
judges: many of them have formal law degrees, reflecting
substantial formal legal training. In contrast, many of the justices
of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court have been lay persons.
While discomfort with part-time judges may not be completely
284. See supra notes 230-234 and accompanying text.
285. U.S. Census 2000, http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html (last
visited Nov. 2, 2004).
286. BUILDING COOPERATION, supra note 114, app. B.
287. Leech Lake, for example, has approximately 10,000 members, while Red
Lake has about 5,000. U.S. Census 2000, supra note 285.
288. Minnesota Petition Hearing, supra note 227.
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devoid of merit, a tribe should not be forced to wait until it can
develop a full-time case docket to begin a tribal judiciary. If a tribe,
in its sovereign judgment, decides to swear in part-time judges,
those judges are clothed in the tribe’s sovereignty and their
decisions should be respected as such.
Unfortunately, the environment in Minnesota is such that not
all have accepted the fundamental concept of tribal sovereignty.
Indeed, the Minnesota Rule faced opposition from groups that are
not focused particularly on tribal courts, but that seek to raise a far
289
broader point: they question the lawful basis of tribal sovereignty.
In light of the long line of statutes, Supreme Court cases, and
executive actions affirming tribal sovereignty, such claims are
absurd. Public Law 280, however, may have helped to create an
environment in which such claims can be made.
Public Law 280 should not be seen as an insurmountable
barrier to good judicial policy on the recognition of tribal
judgments. Indeed, Wisconsin, another Public Law 280 state, has
adopted a recognition rule that is highly respectful of tribal
290
courts.
Thus, while Minnesota’s approach to tribal courts has
probably been strongly affected by Public Law 280, Minnesota’s
agnostic approach to tribal courts was not inevitable. Other factors
must have been involved.
B. The Influence of Federal and State Leadership
In Arizona, the recognition proposal began at the state
supreme court level and it seems to have had tremendous support
291
Yet, even though the question at issue was whether the
there.
289. See supra notes 230-237 and accompanying text.
290. WIS. STAT. § 806.245 (2003) (proclaiming full faith and credit for tribal
courts, but setting forth a list of requirements that look more like comity).
291. Arizona’s process began at the request of the Conference of Chief
Justices; the Arizona Supreme Court issued an administrative order for the
establishment of Arizona’s Tribal Court/State Court Forum. David Withey, the
Chief Counsel for the Arizona Supreme Court, was an active participant on the
Arizona Court Forum from the very first meeting. Some of the Arizona Supreme
Court Justices themselves appear to have been more supportive of the Arizona
Forum. The forum’s report, for instance, contains a lengthy and glowing
expression of gratitude to former Chief Justice Frank X. Gordon. BUILDING
COOPERATION, supra note 114, at 3 (stating “[h]e has, among other things, opened
the State Court Judges’ Annual Conference and training to tribal court judges; he
has established good working relationships with many tribal court judges; he has
visited tribal courts; and he has actively and consistently supported the efforts of
this Forum”). Former Chief Justice, Stanley G. Feldman co-authored an article
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state courts should recognize tribal court judgments and orders,
there was a significant federal component to the initiative. Not
only were federal judges and officials involved in the process of
292
developing the proposal within the Arizona Court Forum, it was
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wilson v. Marchington that provided
293
inspiration for the substance of the rule. The existence of federal
common law and the pervasive effect of federal law in Indian
country in Arizona undoubtedly produced a different environment
than in Minnesota, where Public Law 280 has made state authority
more pervasive.
In Minnesota, leadership at the state supreme court level was
brief. In addition, Public Law 280 has also had the effect of defederalizing Indian country and removing federal officials and
federal judges from important public policy questions related to
tribal courts. With greater involvement by federal officials, who
would have been influenced presumably by strong federal policies
favoring tribal self-determination and the pervasive notion of the
federal government’s trust responsibility to look out for tribes in
interactions with states, the result may have been different.
C. The Road Ahead
294

Public Law 280 remains the law of the land.
As long as
Public Law 280 remains in place, tribal courts will remain, to some

entitled “Resolving State-Tribal Jurisdictional Dilemmas” with David Withey in
1995. See Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Withey, Resolving State-Tribal Jurisdictional
Dilemmas, 79 JUDICATURE 154 (1995). In contrast, Minnesota’s proposal proceeded
in almost a grassroots fashion with support coming primarily from tribal court and
lower state court judges. While Justice Gardebring of the Minnesota Supreme
Court helped to establish the Minnesota Forum, she soon left the bench and the
forum no longer enjoyed the visible support of a state supreme court justice.
From then on, the state leadership came from Judge Robert Schumacher at the
Court of Appeals level and from district court judges.
292. Minnesota seems to have exported some of the talent to Arizona that was
involved in the development of the Arizona Rules. Judge William C. Canby, Jr.,
born and raised in St. Paul and a graduate of the University of Minnesota Law
School, now serves on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Arizona
and occasionally appeared at Forum meetings. Judge Canby is an expert on
federal Indian law. Other federal officials, including an assistant U.S. attorney,
were members of the Forum. See Minnesota Petition, supra note 58, app. B.
293. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
294. The state has “retroceded” some of its Public Law 280 jurisdiction on the
Bois Forte reservation to the Band and the federal government. B.J. Jones,
Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and
Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 473 n.66 (1998).
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degree, an optional forum for many disputes arising on Indian
lands and will retain exclusive jurisdiction only for causes of action
against the tribe. Public Law 280 need not, however, serve as an
obstacle to tribal court development. As a matter of judicial
economy, and the rational administration of justice, state courts
should welcome the provision of justice by their brethren on tribal
courts. Tribal courts seek to perform the same function that state
courts perform, that is, to provide justice to litigants in a manner
that is consistent with the laws and values of the public they serve.
As the volume of cases in tribal courts increase, state courts will
have more occasions to address tribal court judgments and orders.
Through such work, the courts may develop, through common law,
what the Minnesota Supreme Court stopped short of
accomplishing in the rule. Faced with the issue in a case in which it
must decide, the Minnesota Supreme Court may well establish a
common law rule of comity and respect toward tribal court
judgments. While the issue is sure to percolate up to the state
supreme court eventually, the exceedingly wide discretion
contemplated by the existing rule and the unlikelihood of a
hearing means that the record may not be developed for appellate
review.
If the case reaches the appellate level, there is some reason to
believe that the substantive rule adopted will be more respectful
toward tribes than the Minnesota Rule. In the case of Desjarlait v.
Desjarlait in 1985, the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued an
opinion in which it rejected the strongest and most binding form
of respect, full faith and credit, and seemed to suggest that it was
inclined to approach questions of recognition of tribal court
295
judgments as a matter of comity.
As a matter of law, Desjarlait’s
rejection of federally-mandated full faith and credit seems
296
correct. The exact contours of the rule of comity that it sought to
apply, however, were not delineated.

295. See Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
296. For a short survey of the academic debate, compare Robert N. Clinton et
al., Dispute Resolution in Indian Country: Does Abstention Make the Heart Grow Fonder?,
71 N.D. L. REV. 541, 554 (1995) (stating “I submit, and always have maintained,
that tribal judgments are judgments of the territories within the meaning of the
Full Faith and Credit Act, thereby indicating that they are entitled to the same full
faith and credit as state judgments”) with Robert Laurence, Full Faith and Credit in
Tribal Courts: An Essay on Tribal Sovereignty, Cross-Boundary Reciprocity and the Unlikely
Case of Eberhard v. Eberhard, 28 N.M. L. REV. 19 (1998) (rejecting the view that
tribes are included within the Full Faith and Credit Act).
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If the issue is faced directly, it would seem difficult, however, to
justify a refusal to give any respect to a tribal court ruling. After an
appropriate amount of time and perhaps after district courts have
had an opportunity to struggle with the virtually unlimited grant of
discretion in the Minnesota Rule, the Minnesota Supreme Court
should reconsider the issue. At that time, it would be well within
the mainstream of state courts nationwide if it adopted a rule that
was cautiously respectful of tribal court decisions; it would also be
consistent with the nascent development of common law in this
297
state as represented by Desjarlait. Comity is the approach taken in
Wilson v. Marchington and such a rule constitutes a sensible
298
approach to these questions.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the legacies of Public Law 280 is an unwarranted
disrespect for tribal governmental institutions. Because Indian
tribal governments have a sovereign right to establish tribal courts,
such disrespect is unfounded. If tribal courts exist, they are
required by federal law to provide many of the same protections to
litigants that state courts must provide. By providing these
protections, they earn the right to be treated with respect by state
courts.
The Minnesota Supreme Court Rule on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Tribal Court Orders and Judgments is a step
forward in state-tribal relations because it provides a clear avenue
to the recognition of tribal court judgments. It is a very modest
step, however.
Minnesota should consider implementing a
stronger rule that would clearly demonstrate respect for tribal
courts, provide more direction to state district judgments to
promote uniform treatment of tribal rulings, and encourage
cooperation between tribal and state courts.

297.
298.

379 N.W.2d 139.
127 F.3d 805.
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